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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of recent research on estimating competitive interaction in food product categories. In
particular, the focus of this review is on research using scanner data conducted at the disaggregate (e.g., store, chain or
local market) level, including empirical studies of vertical (i.e., within-channel) conduct. Studies addressing the
competitive interaction on price, as well as non-price variables (e.g., in-store display and feature advertising) are
considered.
The author first describes the methodologies available for measuring the competitive interaction between firms and then
briefly summarizes recent empirical developments. Given the complexity of the interactions that take place in practice, it
is argued that much of the richness of actual competitive behavior is lost in aggregate analysis. Competitive interaction is
the result of a complex set of variables and influences–demand side factors, market and industry structure, firm
“personality,” and category characteristics all interact in a complex fashion to determine strategic behavior of retailers and
manufacturers.
Keywords: Competition, Competitive Strategy, Channel BehaviorCompetitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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1. Introduction
A central characteristic of competition is that firms
are mutually dependent–the outcome of an action by one
firm depends to some extent on the reaction of its
competitors. To further complicate matters, the game
being played between firms within a strategic group may
be very different from a game being played across
strategic groups.  For example, Coke and Pepsi may
cooperate with each other when it comes to determining
their promotion schedules but compete fiercely with any
marketing response from a member outside the strategic
group (e.g., a private label).
1 Further still, both vertical
and horizontal elements of conduct play important roles–
not only can channel behavior significantly affect market
equilibria, but seemingly innocuous assumptions on retail
level demands can implicitly place rather restrictive
assumptions on the types of conduct permitted (Genesove
and Mullin 1998, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998, Lee
and Staelin 1997).
Despite the fact that much of the “action” in many
product categories occurs between individual market
players and/or at the local market level, much of the
recent empirical IO research has been conducted at the
aggregate level. For example, using a New Empirical
Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework, Gasmi,
Laffont and Vuong (1992) and Gasmi and Vuong (1991)
examine collusive behavior in the soft drink market over
the period 1968-1986 employing quarterly data
aggregated at the national level. Genesove and Mullin
(1998) examine market power in the sugar industry 1890-
1914 using aggregate U.S. data. Bhuyan and Lopez
(1997) take a similar approach in examining oligopoly
power in forty food and tobacco categories at the national
four-digit SIC level.
In this review, we argue that understanding and
assessing the competitive interaction that exists in the
marketplace requires careful attention to the interaction
that occurs at the disaggregate level (e.g., between
individual food manufacturers, between individual
retailers selling national brands and private labels, and
between the retailers and food manufacturers within the
channel). While there may be value in understanding
“average” overall industry conduct using national data,
there are severe limitations of such an approach. For
example, analysis conducted at the national level can miss
                                               
1. Spiller and Favaro (1984) make a similar argument,
distinguishing across two groups, one a “dominant” and the
other a “fringe” group.
much of the richness of the interaction that occurs
between individual market players discussed above. In
addition, recent work has demonstrated that the biases
associated with measuring market response using data
aggregated at the national level can be severe (Christen,
et al. 1997). Further, this is exacerbated by the use of
linear demand schedules in many NEIO studies (see, e.g.,
Genesove and Mullin 1998, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar
1998). Today, scanner data at the firm, chain level and
local market level are widely available. These data
generally contain very detailed information on retail
marketing decisions, market structure characteristics and
local market demographics, often broken down by
individual store or chain. Further, the availability of
wholesale price data, which can aid in the attribution of
market power between channel members (see, e.g.,
Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1998), is becoming
more common. Recent studies have used scanner data to
infer within channel conduct with (Kadiyali, Chintagunta
and Vilcassim 1998) and without (Cotterill, Putsis and
Dhar 1998) wholesale price data.
In most instances, observed market conduct and the
source of market power (e.g., manufacturer versus
retailer) can be an important consideration managerially.
While it may be interesting to know, for example, that
market power in an industry has grown over the past 25
years, this finding in and of itself has little managerial
relevance. Since the outcome of a firm's action depends at
least partly upon the behavior of its rivals, it is important
for firms to understand the nature of the game being
played, not just the aggregate market outcome. In the
extreme, failure to account for these differences can call
into question the validity of results obtained by
aggregating across market players.
Although competitive response can be understood
along several different dimensions (e.g., Ramaswamy,
Gatignon, and Reibstein 1994; Bowman and Gatignon
1996), an important first step in this direction requires an
understanding about the type of interaction that actually
occurs. Thus, the objectives of this paper are simple ones
–to describe the methodologies available for the empirical
estimation of competition and to summarize recent
developments assessing the types of competitive
interaction that exists in the market. In particular, our
focus is on the direction of the reaction in practice–is it a
retaliatory move, accommodating in nature, or leader-
follower in nature? In doing so, this work relies heavily
on two recent papers by this author (Putsis and Dhar
1998a, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998).Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the
methodologies available for estimating competitive
interaction. Next, we focus on recent developments in
estimating competitive interaction–a reaction function
approach based on LA/AIDS demands (Cotterill, Putsis
and Dhar 1998) and conjectural variations approaches
(Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1998, Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1998, Putsis and Dhar 1998a,
1998b). We also discuss recent developments concerning
demand functional form and vertical versus horizontal
conduct. The paper concludes with suggestions for future
research.
2. Estimating Competitive Interaction
Previous theoretical research on competition has
typically employed non-cooperative game theory under
Nash equilibrium (e.g., Lal 1990, Raju, Srinivasan and
Lal 1990).  In such models, the form of competitive
interaction between firms is assumed (e.g., Stackelberg
leader-follower behavior in Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar
1995 and Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998).  While the
assumptions of firm interaction in theoretical models of
competition are reasonable, there is limited empirical
evidence regarding the type of competitive interaction that
actually occurs between firms in the marketplace.
Empirical research assessing competitive interaction,
which did not even begin until the late 1970’s and early
1980’s (e.g., Gollop and Roberts 1979, Bresnahan 1981;
see Bresnahan 1989), suggests that there is significant
variation in the competitive interaction observed across
categories and marketing mix instruments (Slade 1995).
For example, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) find that
cigarette advertising is cooperative, while Gasmi, Laffont
and Vuong (1992) reject cooperative behavior in the soft-
drink market. Slade (1995) finds that advertising in the
market for saltine crackers lies somewhere between the
two.
Empirical estimation of competitive interaction
entails some simplifications of the games being played
and or the players involved in the game. For example, we
can specify a n-firm game across multiple strategic
decision variables and we can often solve for closed form
solutions for decision variables. However, identifying
such a game empirically is another matter. Consequently,
one way of simplifying empirical analysis entails
examining only two firms in a market. In the case where
the market can be represented reasonably well by a
duopoly (e.g., Coke versus Pepsi in Gasmi, Laffont and
Vuong 1992), such a simplification is reasonable.
However, very few markets can be appropriately
characterized as a duopoly. Focusing on only two firms in
an oligopoly or in a monopolistically competitive industry
is often inappropriate since it necessary entails assuming
that the reactions and/or conjectures of all other firms are
zero. One way of resolving this issue is to distinguish
between how firms compete between versus across
strategic groups in an industry (Spiller and Favaro 1984,
Porter 1985, Putsis and Dhar 1998a, 1998b). For
example, competition between national “branded” and
store “private label” products has increased dramatically
in recent years. Market leaders like Procter & Gamble
and Eastman Kodak have decreased prices and altered
promotional strategies in response to increased private
label penetration in their markets (Business Week, May 2,
1994).  Similarly, firms within a strategic group (e.g.,
two national brands) can also compete fiercely with each
other.
Previous research assessing the competitive
interaction between firms has essentially taken on four
forms: non-nested model comparisons, conjectural
variation approaches, reaction function and time-series
causal approaches. Non-nested model comparisons entail
deriving equilibrium conditions under the assumption of a
certain type of firm behavior (e.g., Nash or Stackelberg).
Using non-nested hypothesis tests of the type introduced
by Vuong (1989), the objective is to test which form of
non-cooperative behavior best fits the data (since the
equilibrium conditions are typically non-nested, non-
nested hypotheses tests are needed). Examples of research
of this type include Gasmi and Vuong (1991), Gasmi,
Laffont and Vuong (1992) and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta (1996). Since a researcher infers firm
behavior based upon the choice of which form of
interaction fits the data best from a menu of competing
possibilities, this approach is often referred to as the
“menu approach.”
By contrast, the conjectural variations approach
treats firm conduct as a continuous parameter to be
estimated (see, e.g., Bresnahan 1989 and Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1998, Putsis and Dhar 1998a,
1998b). Based on early work by Iwata (1974), and more
recent work by Gollop and Roberts (1979), Spiller and
Favaro (1984) and Gelfand and Spiller (1987), this
approach entails the estimation of a conjectural variation
or “conduct” parameter, which essentially measures
deviation from Nash behavior.
2  That is, if both firms in a
                                               
2 . Note that Nash behavior is typically defined by the
absence of a competitive response.  For example, Nash-
Bertrand behavior implies the absence of a price response.Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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duopoly have estimated conduct parameters equal to zero,
then Nash (or “independent”) behavior is inferred.  If only
one firm had an estimated conduct parameter greater than
zero, then a leader-follower relationship is inferred (we
present a typology of interaction below). An advantage of
this approach is that it does not assume a specific type of
market interaction, rather it allows the research to let the
data describe the market interaction (via the estimated
conduct parameter). In addition, marginal costs and
price-cost margins are estimated directly from the data.
Since this approach entails the simultaneous estimation of
the first order conditions directly, it is not identical to
estimating each firm’s reaction function. Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1998) provide a useful
discussion regarding the interpretation of the conduct
parameters, while Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992)
employ both non-nested model comparisons and a
conjectural variation approach. The interested reader may
also want to look at the classic papers by Iwata (1974)
and Bresnahan (1989).
Reaction function approaches of the sort used in
Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar (1998) contrasts with the CV
approach in that it solves the first order conditions for
each player, expressing each decision variable as a
function of rival’s decision variables. This provides a
researcher with a functional form specification based
upon each player’s “best response” given certain
assumptions about the underlying demand structure and
competitive environment. As pointed out by Liang (1987)
and Tirole (1988), the reaction coefficients are generally
a complex function of the demand coefficients and the
conjectures.
3 As with a CV approach, marginal costs and
price cost margins can be estimated directly from the
data.
Time series causal approaches employ time series
data and causality tests such as Granger causality to infer
causality in interaction.  The intuition is simple: if firm
two reacts to changes in firm one’s marketing actions,
then firm two’s reaction will be observed after firm one’s
behavior. These time-sequenced sets of events imply that
firm one is the leader and firm two the follower.  Leeflang
                                                                                 
We will generally use the term “independent” in this paper,
although Nash and independent can be used interchangeably
in this context (as in Raju and Roy 1997).
3.  We note that for consistent conjecture models, the CV
and reaction function approaches produce identical estimates
of competitive interaction. If a model is a consistent
conjecture model, then firm one’s (two’s) conjecture about
changes in P
2 (P
1) when it changes P
1 (P
2) would be equal to





and Wittink (1992) use causality tests to infer firm
reactions across marketing instruments. One potentially
valuable use of causality tests is in inferring and
confirming leader-follower relationships estimated by
either a menu or a conjectural variations approach.  An
example of a recent study employing Granger causality is
work by Raju and Hanssens (1994).  Hanssens, et al.,
(1990, Chapter 5) present an excellent overview of
causality tests.
3. Possible Forms of Competitive Interaction
Previous research has attempted to classify or
categorize competitive interaction. For example, Raju and
Roy (1997) define three forms of competitive interaction:
independent (Nash), leader-follower (Stackelberg) and
collusive. Under independent behavior, each player takes
its rival’s strategic actions as given and acts to maximize
its own profits. Under leader-follower behavior, one firm
acts as the leader (i.e., it does not react to it’s rival’s
actions), while its rival follows changes in the leader’s
strategic behavior. Under collusive behavior, firms act to
maximize joint profits. Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta (1998) characterize competitive pricing
behavior according to Nash (independent), cooperative
(positive conduct parameters, i.e., both firm’s pricing
actions move together) and competitive behavior
(negative conduct parameters). Ramaswamy, Gatignon,
and Reibstein (1994) recognized an inherent asymmetry
in the inferred interactions: while simultaneous price
increases might be evidence of coordinated behavior,
simultaneous price cuts might be indicative of
“retaliatory” behavior.
We build on this research and divide competitive
interaction into patterns that are symmetric versus those
that are asymmetric.
4 In doing so, we expand on much of
the previous research that has primarily addressed price
interaction by considering both price and non-price (e.g.,
in-store display and feature advertising). Further, we
differentiate between “regular” price versus “temporary”
price reductions. These are important distinctions since,
as we will see shortly, there is likely to be significant
                                               
4. In our attempt to categorize competitive interaction
below, we have tried to be as descriptive as possible, while
also following previous research (e.g., Ramaswamy,
Gatignon, and Reibstein 1994, Raju and Roy 1997, Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1998). Note that non-cooperative
interaction can be consistent with both the “retaliatory” and
“cooperative” behavior suggested by Ramaswamy, Gatignon,
and Reibstein (1994).   Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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variation in the type of competitive interaction observed
across marketing mix variables.
For illustration, imagine a differentiated duopoly,
with each firm producing one product and facing strategic
promotion decisions. Symmetric interaction implies both
firms respond to actions by its rival in a similar fashion.
For example, cooperative promotions imply that
promotional decisions are made in a coordinated fashion
– if one firm increases its promotional intensity, the other
cuts its promotional intensity to accommodate. Examples
of this type of interaction might include the famed Coke-
Pepsi alternating promotions. Alternatively, non-
cooperative promotions imply that an increase (decrease)
in the promotional intensity of one firm is met by an
increase (decrease) in the promotional intensity of its
rival. Two firms competing for end of year market share
via extensive coupon drops would constitute non-
cooperative behavior.
5 Finally, note that a lack of a
response by both rivals is also symmetric. Thus, we will
include a third form of symmetric behavior, independent
(sometimes referred to as Nash), which implies a lack of
response by both rivals. Independent behavior might be
expected, for example, in markets where demand
substitutability is weak.  Here, since there is little or no
cross-promotion response, the competitive response is
also likely to be quite small.
We also consider two forms of asymmetric behavior.
Leader-follower (Stackelberg) behavior implies that one
firm reacts to changes in it’s rival’s actions (the
“follower”), while the other (the “leader”) does not.
Often, private labels are thought to follow national
brands’ marketing efforts, although we allow for private
labels to be a leader as well as a follower below.  The
final form of interaction allows for the case where two
firm’s competitive strategies may be opposite in direction,
i.e., where one firm behaves cooperatively, while the
other competes in a non-cooperative fashion.  For
example, one firm may simply follow the actions of a
stronger rival.  A weaker, or “fringe” firm, may simply
not be willing to take the dominant firm on directly, hence
accommodating its larger rival’s promotional efforts.
However, firms with a “dominant” share position might
fiercely defend its market position, taking on a non-
cooperative stance. We will refer to this form of
                                               
5. We note that for price decisions, these definitions will
be reversed.  That is, cooperative pricing implies that prices
rise and fall together, while non-cooperative pricing implies
that they move in opposite directions. Also, note that each
form of symmetric interaction is symmetric in direction, but
not necessarily in magnitude.
interaction as “dominant/fringe-firm” behavior (Spiller
and Favaro 1984).
Let us define things a bit more formally. Imagine that
the two firms in this duopoly have multiple marketing
instruments at their disposal: regular price (P1 and P2),
temporary price reductions (g1 and g2), and non-price
promotions (e.g., feature and/or display, denoted by m1
and m2). Quantities are represented by Q1 and Q2,
respectively. We will denote the competitive response of
firm 1 to a change in firm 2’s actions by the relevant
partial derivative.  For example, ¶g1 / ¶g2 denotes the
response of firm 1 to firm 2’s temporary price reduction.
Although cross-promotion response is certainly possible
(Leeflang and Wittink 1992), we focus on like-instrument
response here in the interest of parsimony. We also note
that cooperative price promotion, for example, does not
necessarily imply cooperative non-price promotions. In
practice, it may often be the case that firms compete
vigorously on price (for example), but accommodate
changes in the feature advertising of their rivals. Table 1
details the categorization discussed above in the context
of the conduct parameters to be estimated. Note that since
temporary price reductions are expressed as an average
price reduction, the signs for this variable in Table 1 are
opposite that of regular (non-deal) price.
Using this characterization, it is possible to begin to
put together a more complete picture of strategic response
using promotion response as an example. Given a firm’s
decision to promote, competitive behavior and demand
interacts as depicted in Figure 1. On the consumer side,
issues such as cross-category effects, the ability to
stockpile a promoted item for future use, and how salient
the item is all influence the demand response. In addition,
the firm’s rivals will likely respond according to one of
the responses characterized above. It is only after the
demand and supply side responses are put together that
we can get a complete picture of market behavior. The
key empirically is to be able to identify and estimate each
separately. The focus of much of the work discussed in
this review is to do precisely this.
4. Assessing Competitive Interaction–Research to
Date
So, given this discussion of models of strategic
interaction, what do we currently know about the nature
of  competition between firms?  Recent research suggests
that there is significant variation in the competitive
interaction observed across categories (Slade 1995) and
across marketing mix instruments (e.g. price versus in-Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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Once again, these insights could only be obtained by a
more disaggregate analysis of the type used here.
5. Demand Functional Form and Aggregation Biases
  Thus, empirical analysis suggests that the functional
form of the demand equation can potentially play an
important role in not only assessing demand response, but
vertical and horizontal competitive response as well. This
is supported by previous theoretical research that has
demonstrated that the form of the demand function has
implications for vertical channel behavior. For example,
Lee and Staelin (1997) show that “the type of vertical
strategic interaction present in a given environment is
closely related with the convexity of the demand curve
and the level of demand for a given price” (p. 185).
In an empirical IO framework, Genesove and Mullin
(1998) note that the linear demands used in prior
empirical studies impose strong assumptions on the
relationship between retail price and marginal cost. For
example, specifying linear demands and constant
manufacturer marginal costs under Manufacturer
Stackelberg conduct in a monopolistic retail environment
(e.g., Choi 1991) implies that exactly 50% of any
wholesale price increase is always passed through to the
consumer by the retailer. More generally, the passthrough
rate under linear demands is always less than 100%
(Harris and Sullivan 1979) regardless of the type of retail
competition that exists. The requirement that less than
100% of wholesale price changes (in the linear case) are
passed on to the consumer appears to be at odds with
actual behavior within the channel and may be overly
restrictive. Flexible passthrough rates (which can vary
from less than zero to over 100%) exist only for a class
of flexible non-constant elasticity demand curves, which
includes the LA/AIDS model (Cotterill, Buckhold and
Egan 1999). Ideally, one would like to specify a demand
functional form that does not restrict retailer’s pricing
actions to estimate the change in retail price that results
from wholesale price changes (Cotterill 1998). Clearly,
the linear form, used in much of the NEIO work, is not
ideal in this regard.
In addition, aggregate analysis suffers from another
potentially serious problem. Christen, Gupta, Porter,
Staelin and Wittink (1997), using analytic, empirical, and
numerical analysis, demonstrate that the estimated
demand response from linearly aggregated market-level
                                                                                 
generally passes on more than 100% of the deal. Linear
demands do not allow for this possibility.
or national data differ substantially from comparable
effects obtained from store-level data. That is, not only do
national data provide for biased estimates of the store (or
disaggregate) level response, even aggregate models
applied to aggregate data provide biased estimates of the
aggregate response. Further, the bias can be severe–
price elasticity estimates using simulated market level
data were estimated to be as much as 1232% of the true
underlying response. The reason for this is analogous to
the temporal aggregation bias discussed in detail in Putsis
(1996). In essence, aggregate data are obtained by
linearly aggregating disaggregate data. Thus, if the
underlying demand response is non-linear then there is a
fundamental difference between the demand function
evaluated at some “average” level of price and the
average of individual demands evaluated at the actual
price paid at retail. Through similar rationale, if all
consumers faced equal prices, then the bias would be
zero. As a result, the general line of reasoning for
researchers addressing scanner data is that data
aggregated to the chain level is likely to be relatively free
of the bias (since prices faced by consumers across
different stores within the same chain tend to be the
same).
However, certain empirical approaches can minimize
the potential for such a bias. For example, the PIGLOG
form of the LA/AIDS model allows estimation at various
levels of aggregation, minimizing the assumptions
necessary to avoid linear aggregation bias (Christen, et
al. 1997).  Specifically, it is easy to demonstrate that any
bias in marketing mix response estimates can be
eliminated by taking the first difference, provided that
relative store prices remain the same from one period to
the next.
8 Further, Christen, et al. (1997) suggest a
debiasing procedure that can be applied to aggregate
data. Nonetheless, such methods are not easy to
implement in practice and little empirical work has been
                                               
8. This can be shown quite easily. Under a first difference
model, all variables are expressed as the change from period t
to t+1.  Since the marketing mix response in a LA/AIDS
specification is log-log in share, first differencing expresses
prices, for example, as the log of the ratio of prices in t and t-
1.  As long as the relative prices move together, the ratio of
the prices is constant.  Thus, if the percent change in prices is
the same from store to store, the bias is eliminated (this is
analogous to homogeneous marketing mix variables in the
Christen, et al. 1996 paper).  Thus, it is not necessary that all
consumers at all stores face the same prices. We would argue
that assuming that the relative prices remain the same from
one period to the next is more tenable than assuming that all
stores have the same prices.Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report #41 8
conducted to see how well the bias is actually removed.
6. Assessing Within-Channel Interactions
Given the implications of demand form for the
implied vertical conduct, some recent research has
attempted to assess vertical conduct empirically. Cotterill
and Putsis (1998), in an initial attempt to examine some
of the assumptions made in previous theoretical research
(e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin
1983, Choi 1991, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995),
empirically examine the vertical channel assumptions
made in two well-cited models of retailer-manufacturer
interaction: a) the Choi (1991) Manufacturer-Stackelberg
(MS) model, and b) the Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar
(1995) Stackelberg model addressing store brands.
Specifically, empirical tests were developed for
Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct and the use of
proportional mark-up rules within the channel. Their
empirical results generally support the assumptions of
proportional mark-up behavior by retailers and
Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct within the channel. In
addition, since the Choi (1991) and Raju, et al. (1995)
models assumed relatively simple linear demand
structures, Cotterill and Putsis (1998) then examined how
well these linear demands characterize actual market
behavior by comparing them to a flexible non-linear
form, the LA/AIDS model. Using non-nested hypothesis
tests, linear demands were rejected in a favor of a more
flexible non-linear form. When combined with the
analytical work of Lee and Staelin (1997), this suggests
that additional theoretical and empirical work is needed in
order to fully understand the implications of using a
linear demand specification.
In related work with available wholesale price data,
Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1998) use weekly
store level data from the analgesics category to assess
both vertical and horizontal competitive interactions for
two retailers (R1 and R2) and two manufacturers (M1
and M2). These interactions are represented in Figure 2
below. Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim take an
interesting approach. Specifically, they specify a menu of
four different possible vertical relationships
(Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Vertical Nash (VN),
Retailer Stackelberg (RS)–see Choi 1991–and an
additional proposed model) between manufacturers and
retailers. Competitive interactions are estimated using a
conjectural variations approach. Based this menu of
vertical conduct, they use non-nested hypothesis tests
(Vuong 1989) to choose the best fitting game. For the
product category studied (analgesics), they find that
manufacturer power, as measured by manufacturer mark-
up (relative to retailer mark-up) is greater than that of the
retailer for the national brands considered. They note that
this is consistent with the findings of Cotterill and Putsis
(1998) that retailers tend to use proportional mark-ups
applied to the wholesales prices charged by
manufacturers. It is also interesting to note that out of the
three models of vertical interaction previously considered
in the literature (MS, VN and RS, as discussed in Choi
1991), the Manufacturer Stackelberg model is the best
fitting, also consistent with the findings of Cotterill and
Putsis (1998).
9 As with each of the studies discussed
above, detailed analysis of this sort cannot be conducted
with aggregate industry level data. Thus, these findings
provide substantive and managerially useful information
that could not be obtained without conducting a detailed
intra-category analysis using micro, disaggregate data.
7. Conclusions
It should be clear from the discussion above that no
one type of strategic interaction explains competition in
all food product category.  Further, the pattern of
interaction is often quite complex, with significant
variation across instruments within any single food
product category. Most of the empirical research to date
is consistent with the notion that competitive rivalry is not
symmetric and that not all marketing mix actions require
a similar response.
This suggests that competitive interaction in any
category is the result of a complex set of variables and
influences.  Demand side factors, market and industrial
structure, firm “personality,” and category characteristics
all interact in a complex fashion to determine strategic
behavior, as outlined in Figure 1. Further, each marketing
mix instrument is likely to be used as a strategic weapon
for different objectives, suggesting that firms may very
well take different competitive stances with each
instrument. Further, there has been little research that
attempts to explain why firms act as they do.  What
determines when a cooperative stance is optimal?  What
settings encourage independent (Nash) response? In
practice, one clear implication is that managers need to
take the direction and magnitude of the competitive
response into account in evaluating the likely impact of a
change in the firm’s marketing mix. In reality, we are just
beginning to understand the determinants of strategic
                                               
9. We note that their proposed model of vertical conduct
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interaction. Nonetheless, there are a variety of
methodologies available for addressing the competitive
interaction between firms. This review represents an
initial attempt to put together a more complete picture of
the techniques available and the set of results obtained
thus far.
Given the complexity of the interactions that take
place in practice, it seems clear that much of the richness
of actual competitive behavior is lost in aggregate
analysis. Further, even if aggregation biases were not
present and aggregate industry level analyses of price-
cost margins were able to produce accurate measures of
market power and conduct, attributing the source of
market power is largely impossible. Given the complexity
of the distribution process, cooperative or
accommodating behavior (for example) can mean many
different things depending upon the vertical market
structure and channel behavior. Considerations such as
linear aggregation biases and the relationship between the
demand form and retail passthrough/channel conduct
cannot be ignored in empirical IO analysis. While many
of these issues are now being addressed in the literature,
it seems clear that future research must be conducted at
the more disaggregate level if the analysis is to have any
managerial relevance. Fortunately, scanner data that
permit such analysis are widely available.
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Appendix–Empirical Estimation (Putsis and Dhar 1998a)
Employing a simple duopoly model and a traditional
conjectural variations approach (Iwata 1974, Bresnahan
1989, Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong 1992), the following
framework was used as the basis for the empirical analysis.
Employing the notation from the text, designating the
national brand as firm 1 and the private label as firm 2, and
given assumptions made in Putsis and Dhar (1998a)
regarding manufacturer-retailer interaction, the set of
structural equations can be stated as follows (following Iwata
1974, the equations represent two demand equations followed
by the first order conditions for manufacturers and a
monopolistic retailer):
Q1  = a0+a1P1+a2P2+a3g1+a4g2+a5m1+a6m2 (A1)
Q2  = b0+b1P1+b2P2+b3g1+b4g2+b5m1+b6m2 (A2)
P1  = - [Q1/(¶Q1/¶P1)] - (MC1+g1+am1)
=  - [Q1/(a1+a2(¶P2/¶P1))] - (MC1+g1+am1)  (A3)
g1   = - [Q1 / (¶Q1 / ¶g1)]  +  (P1 -MC1 - am1)
   =  - [Q1 / (a3 + a4(¶g2/¶g1))]  +  (P1 -MC1 - am1) (A4)
m1  =  [(P1- g1- MC1) /a] - [Q1 / (¶Q1 / ¶m1)]
=  [(P1- g1- MC1) /a] - [Q1 / (a5 + a6(¶m2/¶m1)] (A5)Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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P2  =  -[Q2 / (¶Q2 / ¶P2)]  -  MC2
=  -[Q2 / (b2 + b1(¶P1/¶P2))]  -  MC2 (A6)
 
g2   = [{-Q2+ (k1P1 (a4 + a3(¶g1/¶g2)))}/{b4 + b3(¶g1/¶g2)}]
+  (k2P2 - bm2), (A7)
m2  = [{(k1P1(a6 + a5(¶m1/¶m2)))-bQ2}/
{b(b6+b5 (¶m1/¶m2))}] + [(k2P2 - g2)/b] (A8)
The set of terms {a0, ... , a6}, {b0, ... , b6}, { k1, k2, a, b,
MC1 and MC2} represent parameters to be estimated. MC1
and MC2 represent the marginal costs of firm 1 and firm 2,
respectively, which are estimated directly. In addition,
F(2ﬁ1) ” {(¶P2/¶P1), (¶g2/¶g1), (¶m2/¶m1)} and
F(1ﬁ2) ” {(¶P1/¶P2), (¶g1/¶g2), (¶m1/¶m2)} denote the
relevant set of conjectural variation or “conduct”
parameters.
10  These conduct parameters, continuous
parameters to be estimated, represent the “expectations” that
a firm has about the reactions of its rivals.  Firms hold certain
beliefs about their rivals, with these beliefs being realized in
equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, these conduct parameters
are consistent and can be used to infer actual market behavior
(Bresnahan 1989).
11  
The objective was to estimate these structural equations
directly, thereby obtaining estimates of the conduct
parameters above.  In doing so, a series of identifying
restrictions (following Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta
1998) were placed on the system and various instruments
were used in order to allow estimation.  See Putsis and Dhar
(1998a) for details on each player’s relevant profit
maximization, and on the specific set of identifying
restrictions and instruments used in the empirical estimation.
                                               
10.  Note that this formulation, expanded to include
multiple instruments and the presence of an active retailer, is
essentially the same as Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta
(1998) and Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992), pp. 297-301.
11. Note that the partial derivatives above representing
each of the conjectures are identical to the conjectural
variation parameters from previous studies (e.g., g in Iwata,
1974).  Using this approach, we do not estimate reaction
functions (we estimate the first-order conditions directly), so
in this sense, the use of the partial derivatives may seem a bit
misleading.  We do this for two reasons.  First, the notation
above accurately represents the fact that we are estimating
actual market behavior (or “what firms do as the result of
these expectations [about rivals behavior],” Bresnahan 1989,
p. 1029).  Second, given the number of conduct parameters
addressed in the present study, the notation employed above is
much more straightforward.Competitive Interaction in Food Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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Table 1 Price and Promotion Response and Implied Market Interactions
Competitive Interaction Regular Price Promotion
Symmetric Interaction
Independent (Nash) ¶P2/¶P1,¶P1/¶P2 = 0 ¶m1/¶m2, ¶m2/¶m1 = 0
¶g1 / ¶g2, ¶g2 /¶g1 = 0
Cooperative ¶P2/¶P1,¶P1/¶P2 > 0 ¶m1/¶m2, ¶m2/¶m1 < 0
¶g1 / ¶g2, ¶g2 /¶g1 < 0
Non-Cooperative ¶P2/¶P1,¶P1/¶P2 < 0 ¶m1/¶m2, ¶m2/¶m1 > 0
¶g1 / ¶g2, ¶g2 /¶g1 > 0
Asymmetric Interaction
National Brand Leader ¶P2/¶P1 „ 0, ¶P1/¶P2 = 0 ¶m2/¶m1 „ 0, ¶m1/¶m2 = 0
Private Label Follower ¶g2 / ¶g1 „ 0, ¶g1 /¶g2 = 0
Private Label Leader, ¶P2/¶P1 = 0, ¶P1/¶P2  „ 0 ¶m2/¶m1 = 0, ¶m1/¶m2 „ 0
National Brand Follower ¶g2 / ¶g1  = 0, ¶g1 /¶g2 „ 0
National Brand Dominant, ¶P2/¶P1 > 0,¶P1/¶P2 < 0 ¶m2/¶m1 < 0, ¶m1/¶m2 > 0
Private label Fringe ¶g2 / ¶g1 < 0, ¶g1 /¶g2  > 0
Private Label Dominant, ¶P2/¶P1 < 0,¶P1/¶P2 > 0 ¶m2/¶m1 > 0, ¶m1/¶m2 < 0
National Brand Fringe ¶g2 / ¶g1  > 0, ¶g1 /¶g2 < 0
Key: P  denotes regular price
g denotes temporary price reductions
m   denotes non-price promotions (e.g., feature and/or display)
Table 2 Distribution of Estimated Implied Market Interactions Between Private Label (PL) and National Brands (NB) Across 58
Grocery Product Categories
PRICE PREDN FEATURE DISPLAY
Symmetric
INDEPENDENT 4 10 19 9
COOPERATIVE 7 7 6 7
NONCOOPERATIVE 16 10 8 6
Asymmetric
NB LEADER 19 16 19 15
PL LEADER 3 6 1 7
NB DOMINANT 8 8 3 9
PL DOMINANT 1 1 2 5
Source: Putsis and Dhar (1998a)Competitive Interaction in Food  Product Categories William P. Putsis, Jr.
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Figure 1. Category Characteristics, Competitive Response and Promotion Response
1. Cross-Category Effects Measured Response
2. Purchase Acceleration
3. Category Salience
   Demand
        Promotion         Promotion
          (Stimuli)           Simultaneously           Impact
    Determined          (Response)
1. Cooperative




Figure 2. Horizontal and Vertical Interaction as Depicted by Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1998).
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